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1 Introduction
Curriculum tracking is the explicit separation of students into schools or classes
based on observed past or expected future achievement. The tracking literature
has mainly focused on the later-age effect of curriculum tracking on educational
achievement and wages, measuring outcomes after the end of compulsory ed-
ucation or later. I argue that there are good reasons to look at the effects of
tracking policies on early age student outcomes as well.
Tracking creates incentives before its start, amongst others for students to
work harder in order to get into a higher track. The tracking point is a high-
stakes moment for the student, whether the track choice is based on an explicit
test or not.
The idea of incentive effects of tracking is not new. In some form or another
it can for example be found in Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2004), Waldinger
(2006) and Eisenkopf (2009). I add to this literature by making a comprehensive
empirical analysis of the phenomenon using three different data sources. I find
robust causal evidence for incentive effects in the UK and a large and robust
test score gap between early late tracking countries that widens between third
and fourth grade. Estimates based on a Swedish school reform are inconclusive.
Incentive effects of tracking have two main implications. First, they illustrate
that early age educational outcomes are endogenous with respect to later age
educational policies. This means that we should not use test scores at a certain
age to evaluate policies before that age without taking into account policies
after that age, that we should not blindly use value-added specifications to
measure the later age effects of policy, and that regressing pre-policy outcomes
on policy does not generally make for a good ‘placebo test’ of post-treatment
identification.
Second, there is a growing literature on incentives and high-stakes testing in
education (e.g. Bishop, 2006; Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010; Juerges, Schneider,
Senkbeil and Carstensen, 2012). We know that high-stakes at the end of middle
or high school can lead to higher student test scores and sometimes achievement.
The results presented in this paper add to this, and show that institutional
incentives affect measured achievement at earlier ages as well.
There are many mechanisms through which tracking can increase early test
scores. There is a direct incentive for students at the margin of upper track
entry to try to get into the upper track. Attending the higher track will give
students a better peer group, will usually also leave open the possibility to enter
higher education at the end of secondary school, and is a labor market signal of
ability of its own. Teachers can also be incentivized because the track placement
of their students is easily observable, making it easier for for principals to reward
and punish teacher effort as well as easier for parents to choose higher achieving
schools for their children.
Students and teachers may substitute effort from non-tested subjects to
tested ones. Because of spillover effects between subjects, the net effect of
tracking on achievement in non-tested subjects does however not have to be
negative. (cf. Winters, Greene, and Trivitt, 2008)
Tracking policies may also affect the early curricula and teaching styles in a
more institutionalized way. The educational system may evolve towards stress-
ing early achievement more, especially in tested subjects. Of course, the direc-
tion of causality can also run the other way if early achievement oriented regions
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have refrained from delaying the tracking point (cf. Betts, 2010).
All of these mechanisms suggest that we should expect early test scores to
be higher under an early tracking regime relative to a late tracking regime. The
effects should be particularly large for students close to the margin of upper track
attendance. Very good or very poor students may not feel directly incentivized
because they cannot influence their track placement in any case. The effects
on these students do however not have to be zero. There may be positive or
negative peer effects from other students, and all students will be influenced by
changes to the curriculum or teaching style.
It seems reasonable to think that test score increases do not (only) occur
instantaneously at the tracking point itself, but that there is a period of time
leading up to the tracking point during which students’ test scores grow at an
accelerated pace. It is less clear whether we should expect students in the late
tracking regime to catch up during middle school or not. Test scores certainly
converge after the start of early tracking in Hanushek and Woessmann (2006),
but it is hard to tell whether this is because of to incentive-induced catch-
up growth among late tracking countries or because comprehensive schools are
genuinely more efficient.
2 UK evidence for incentive effects
Since the Second World War, the larger part of the UK has gradually gone from
a tracked to a comprehensive school system. In the old system (Figure 1, top
half), students took the co-called Eleven Plus achievement test around age 11.
Those who did well enough on the Eleven Plus were allowed to enter a upper
track grammar school. Grammar school students could acquire an Ordinary
Level General Certificate of Education or O-level at age 16, and an Advanced
Level General Certificate of Education or A-level at age 18, after which they
could enter higher education. Students who failed to qualify for grammar school
usually entered a vocational secondary modern. Secondary modern students
could either acquire a Certificate of Secondary Education or CSE at age 16, or
leave the education system one year earlier. The highest grade on the CSE was
regarded as equivalent to an O-level.
Because the upper track was limited in size, and because the admittance
procedure was noisy, not even top students could be certain of a place in the
upper track. This can also be seen from Figure 2, where I have plotted the 10th,
50th and 90th percentiles of the predicted probability of upper track attendance
based on age 7 test scores, parental educational attainment and socio-economic
status and other background variables. The median predicted probability of
entering the upper track was less than 10%, and even in the 10th decile group
of age 7 test scores, the median predicted probability of upper track attendance
was only marginally higher than 50%.
In 1964, the Labour government entered the elections with a promise to
abolish the tracked educational system, and wanted to impose the new com-
prehensive system “as rapid as possible.” Once in government however, the
Labour government “requested” rather than demanded that Local Education
Authorities (LEAs) change their policies.
The hesitant Labour attitude was induced by both practical and political
concerns. On the one hand, extensive planning was needed in order to create
2
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Figure 1: The main British secondary school systems around 1969.
In the tracked system (top), an age 11 test determined access to the upper track. In the
comprehensive system (bottom), all students attended the same middle school. Triangles
indicate common exits from secondary education: at the end of compulsory education but
before taking the O-level or CSE examinations at the end of middle school; after completing
middle school; after taking the A-level examinations at the end of high school.
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Figure 2: Limited capacity in upper tracks.
The figure shows the median predicted probability of upper track attendance (circles) as well
as its 10th–90th percentage range (lines) by age 7 test score decile group. Though upper track
attendance was unlikely for low achievers, not even high achievers could be certain of a place
in the upper track. Data: NCDS (University of London 2008).
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Table 1: NCDS sample sizes.
students difference
full sample 18558 0
age 7 and 11 scores known 12066 -6492
age 11 LEA known 11098 -968
tracking status known 8114 -2984
tracking change not in 1969 7150 -964
Note: The main reason for missing tracking information is students attending private schools.
the new schools, in part because of existing investment in school buildings. On
the other hand, LEAs had had considerable autonomy in setting educational
policies themselves since 1944, and their position was strengthened by the rather
narrow Labour majority in parliament in combination with opposition against
reform from within the Labour party.
In the end, comprehensive schooling was implemented in a region-by-region,
school-by-school fashion, both by merging or converting existing schools and by
creating new ones. (Government Circular 10/65, 1965; Benn and Chitty 1996,
ch. 1; Kerckhoff, Fogelman, Crook and Reeder, 1996, ch. 2)
The new comprehensive schools aimed to make available to all children “all
that is valuable in grammar school education” (Government Circular 10/65,
1965). Even though the different comprehensive schools were organized in dif-
ferent ways, the key characteristic of the new schools was that selection did
not take place at age 11, but rather through voluntary exit at the compulsory
schooling age of 15 or otherwise at the CSE or O-level examination. I have
illustrated this in the bottom half of Figure 1.
When using comprehensive school reforms to identify the effects of tracking,
it is important that the reform did not include other simultaneous changes that
also affect outcomes. In this particular case, we are interested in the effects
on test scores at the end of primary school. To the best of my knowledge,
no simultaneous changes were made to the British primary school system in
the years leading up to the reform. This stands in contrast with the Swedish
comprehensive school reform covered below, where simultaneous curricular and
other changes were made to primary schools.
The survey most appropriate to study the UK reform is the longitudinal
National Child Development Study (University of London, 2008) or NCDS. It
aims to follow all those born in Great Britain in the week starting on the 3rd of
March 1958. The 1958 cohort turned 11 in 1969, when one part of the cohort was
selected into one of two tracks, while the other part entered the comprehensive
school system. I will use the 1958 sweep (at the time called Perinatal Mortality
Survey) as well as the 1965, 1969 and 1974 sweeps, when the subjects were 0,
7, 11 and 16 years old.
As can be seen from Table 1, out of the full sample of 18558 students 11098
are left after we require age 7 and age 11 test scores as well as geographical in-
formation to be known. I treat the other 7460 as missing at random conditional
on observables.
It is not a priori clear what tracking status should be assigned to private
schools. I judge that to treat private schools as missing on the tracking variable
is the more conservative choice, and will report estimates excluding this group.
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Figure 3: Number of students in sample by reform year.
The students in the sample all turned 11 in 1969, at which point they were split into tracks in
the pre-reform system. Those entering comprehensive secondary schools (reform year before
1969) should be expected to have lower age 11 scores than those entering schools that reformed
after 1969.
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A small number of private schools indicate in the survey that they are compre-
hensive. When I include these as comprehensive, and other private schools as
tracked, the empirical results stay virtually unchanged.
Another 2984 students disappear from the sample when we exclude private
schools and require tracking information to be known. I also disregard students
whose schools turned comprehensive in the very year they took the age 11 test,
because it is unclear what information they had on the status of their future
schools. I have 7150 students left in the final sample.
The 1974 sweep of the NCDS recorded the tracking status and reform year
of the school the individuals were attending at that point. This measure can be
used to reconstruct the year of reform relative to 1969, the year the individuals
entered the secondary school system.
The distribution of students exposed to the different reform years in the
sample can be seen from Figure 3. The students on the left side of the figure
entered a secondary school that had reformed before 1969, and could be sure of
its comprehensive status. Those on the right side entered a school that reformed
only after 1969, and so faced a tracked system when they did the test. Students
may have had some information on the coming reform, but their subjective
probability of entering a tracked system will have been smaller the later the
reform actually took place. Students in the ‘later’ category were never part
of a comprehensive school during their educational career. I encode tracking
status at age 11 (T ) as a dummy indicating whether the student’s school turned
comprehensive before 1969, or after.
There are multiple measures of age 11 achievement in the data that can be
used as outcome variables: a general ability test containing both verbal and
non-verbal items, a reading comprehension test and a mathematics/arithmetic
test. In addition to these, we have teacher assessments of student abilities in
different domains.
Using test scores as outcome variables is problematic in various ways. Test
scores usually only carry ordinal information. This means that both the ab-
solute and relative score distances between students in different parts of the
distribution are arbitrary (cf. Koerselman, 2011). In the case of the NCDS
test scores, some of the test score distributions are strongly negatively skewed.
There is however no reason to assume that the distribution of achievement has
such skew, and compared to a symmetric distribution using untransformed test
scores would have the effect of weighting the outcomes of low achieving students
heavier.
Instead, I assume that student achievement is an unidimensional, normally
distributed latent trait, and try to extract it. First, I convert all test score
distributions to z-scores. Then, I take the first principal component of the
transformed scores to end up with a measure of general achievement. This
process also reduces measurement error from any of the specific tests.
Even though test scores now follow a symmetric distribution, the units the
scores are expressed in are still meaningless. I therefore express outcomes in
standard deviations. This however means that measurement error in the test
score will lead to bias in the estimated treatment effects as expressed in standard
deviations of the latent trait. Test noise adds to test score variance, and the
noisier the test is, the more we will overestimate the width of the latent trait
distribution. Because we divide our estimates by the standard deviation of
the distribution, the estimates will be biased towards zero if test scores are
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Table 2: NCDS, means of selected variables
tracked areas comprehensive areas
father highly educated 0.20 0.17
father high SES 0.22 0.17
father reads to child every week (age 7) 0.34 0.31
child height below first quintile (age 11) 0.18 0.21
arithmetic score (age 7) 0.01 -0.06
Notes: A father is counted as highly educated if his ISCED level is 3 or higher. A father is counted
as high SES if his social class is professional or manegerial/technical. The first four variables have
been constructed for illustrative purposes. The regressions include indicators for each level of the
original variables.
noisy. Intuitively, the noisier a test is the less treatment will be able to change
standardized test outcomes.
To solve this problem, I calculate the reliability ratio of the age 11 principal
component under the assumption that all measurement error is white noise. This
allows me to inflate the measures’ standard deviations in such a way that the
point estimates will be expressed in standard deviations of the signal. Estimated
noise is however low for the principal component with reliability ratios close to
unity. The difference between this method and simply reporting effect sizes of
the principal component is therefore small in practice.
I select two groups of control variables. The first group Ai consists of the
z-scores of age 7 tests and teacher ratings. These include the results of a
word recognition and word comprehension test, a copying designs test to as-
sess perceptuo-motor abilities, a draw-a-man test to assess general mental and
perceptual abilities, and an arithmetic test.
The second group Xi is a selection of a wide variety of parent and student
background variables. It consists of parental social status and a measure of
their wealth, parental educational attainment and reading habits, measures of
parental involvement in the child’s education at age 7, parental region of birth,
the student’s gender as well as the student’s within-gender height quintile group
at age 11 – a proxy for health.1
The variables in Xi are meant are meant to as fully as possible catch the
determinants of age 11 achievement. For example, students may do worse on
the age 11 tests if they are of poor health, if they come from a lower class, lower
educated family without a reading culture at home, if their parents are uninter-
ested in their education, or if their parents are migrants. All these variables are
qualitative, and to capture as much variation as possible Xi contains dummy
variables for each of the values that they take.
Individual and LEA identifiers are available directly from the data, but in
addition I construct school identifiers in such a way that students are treated
as attending the same school if their school was located in the same LEA and
reformed in the same year. This reduces problems with the reform-induced
restructuring of LEA schools.
To take into account the hierarchical nature of the data, I estimate a mul-
tilevel or hierarchical linear model (e.g. Gelman and Hill, 2007; Pinheiro and
1NCDS variables n1687, n199, n186, n187, n43, n44, n1434, n1436, n622 and dvht11. I refer
to the NCDS documentation for a more detailed description of these variables. In addition to
these, I use the ISCED level of parental education as calculated by Sharon Simonton.
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Bates, 2009) with regressors and error terms on different, nested levels. For the
baseline regressions there are two levels: individuals, and schools, but I also
estimate models where the higher level is the LEA or the reform year instead.
While multilevel models differ conceptually from methods based on least
squares, the estimates of the incentive effects as well as the associated standard
errors are always based on the higher level and are close to those obtained from
OLS on data aggregated to the higher level.
Unfortunately for our purposes, reforms were not implemented at random.
Richer, right-wing areas were slower to reform (Benn and Chitty, 1996, ch. 1;
Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles, 2004). The consequences can also be seen from
Table 2. Students in reform areas had less educated fathers, with lower socio-
economic status, experienced less parental involvement in their education and
were shorter on average, an indication of relatively poor health. Unsurprisingly,
they also had lower test scores at age 7.
Because of the nonrandomness of the reform, a simple comparison of tracked
and comprehensive areas or schools s
ys,i = α+ Tsβ + εs + εi (1)
is likely to show incentive effects even if none exist in reality. Successful iden-
tification of the causal effect of tracking will have to come from adequately
controlling for primary school inputs such as ability and parental and student
background variables.
I claim that controlling for age 7 scores Ai
ys,i = α+ Tsβ +Aiγ + εs + εi (2)
is enough to remove almost all of the bias due to the the nonrandomness of the
reform. A natural way to check this is to add individual background variables
as well
ys,i = α+ Tsβ +Aiγ +Xiδ + εs + εi (3)
and see if the estimate of β changes much. If it does not, this suggests that
controlling for age 7 scores is indeed removing most of the selection.
There is a second kind of selection problem. Even if the reforms would
have been carried out at random, students may not have complied with the
treatment assigned to their school by moving. Families with good students
have an incentive to move to a tracked area when faced with a comprehensive
secondary school, while families with poor students may seek out comprehensive
areas.
In areas where upper track schools remained, the new comprehensive school
may in effect have become the new lower track school, with the upper track
school attracting all good pupils. Since we can control for ability and back-
ground, both forms of selection will lead to an overestimate of incentive effects
only to the degree that movers are unobservably different in the expected direc-
tion.
In specification (4), I restrict the sample to students who did not move to
a different LEA between ages 7 and 11. This reduces the number of students
from 7150 to 5634, and the number of schools from 645 to 556 because the
sampling method causes individual schools to be represented by small numbers
of students.
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If between-region selection is a major problem, the estimate of incentive
effects should be considerably lower in this specification, since it excludes the
presumably higher scoring students that moved to tracked areas and the pre-
sumably lower scoring students that moved to comprehensive areas.
In specification (5), I group by Local Education Authority: the policy-setting
authority of which there are 167 in the sample. I use the proportion of tracked
students within the LEA as a measure of tracking. If observed differences be-
tween tracked and comprehensive students are due to poor students sorting into
comprehensive schools and good students into upper track schools within mixed
LEAs, we, we should expect the estimate of incentive effects to be considerably
lower in this specification as well. Since tracking is an LEA-level variable in
specification (5), this specification also addresses concerns that the standard
errors reported for the other specifications may be too small since they are
calculated on schools rather than on LEAs.
Incentive effects can both be direct through changed student incentives or
indirect though peer effects and changed teacher behavior. We should expect
lower direct incentive effects among those who have little hope of entering the
upper track in any case as well as among those who could be certain of a
place in the upper track. As can be seen from Figure 2, the upper track was
extremely selective. Only very few students could be certain of a place in the
upper track while the median student had an estimated probability of upper
track attendance of slightly less than 10%.
In order to try to separate direct from indirect effects, I create an additional
variable indicating whether the student has a predicted probability of upper
track attendance of less than 10%. I regard these students as not competitive
for the upper track. These students should thus mostly be exposed to indirect
incentive effects. In specification (6), I interact this variable with T to see how
much of the incentive effects are direct.
Additionally, I try to look for evidence of heterogeneous effects with regards
to the timing of the reform. Those who entered a comprehensive secondary
school could be certain of its status, but those entering a school that still had to
reform will have experienced stronger incentives the further away they perceived
the reform to be. We should expect students entering tracked schools not only
to have higher test scores than those entering comprehensive schools, but also
to have higher test scores the further the reform lay in the future.
Results from the first six specifications can be seen from Table 3. Column
(1) shows that the unadjusted relationship between the tracking variable and
age 11 scores is 0.148 of a UK standard deviation. This is a sizable difference,
but probably an overestimate of the causal effect.
Turning to column (2), we can see that the estimated effect indeed declines
to 0.098 standard deviations when we control for the nonrandom nature of the
tracking reforms using age 7 scores. Controlling by age 7 scores only may not be
enough to remove all selection, and I therefore add the wide range of background
variables described above to the next specification. The result can be seen from
column (3). The estimate only decreases by 0.003 standard deviations. This
strongly suggests that age 7 test scores pick up most of the selection, and that
the nonrandom implementation of the reform is not an obstacle to identification
of its effects on early test scores.
In column (4) we see the regression results using nonmovers only. The sample
size is now smaller, reducing precision slightly. Importantly, the estimate of the
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Table 3: Incentive effects in the UK.
specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
tracking (T ) 0.148 0.098 0.095 0.098 0.102 0.169
0.044 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.034 0.029
T×not competitive -0.138
0.036
ability (Ai) yes yes yes yes yes
controls (Xi) yes yes yes yes
students 7150 7150 7150 5634 7150 7150
groups 645 645 645 556 167 645
grouping level school school school school LEA school
Notes: Dependent variable: UK achievement age 11 (1969). Standard errors are calculated on the
(higher) grouping level, and are shown in italics.
effect of tracking is now larger. This suggests that conditional on covariates,
selective moving between LEAs is not a problem for identification.
In column (5) we see the LEA level regression results. Again, estimates are
larger than under the baseline specification (3). This suggests that selective
moving within the LEA is not an obstacle to identification either. A closer look
at the LEA-level errors (available from the author) shows that incentive effects
are almost linear in the proportion of the LEA that is tracked, also suggesting
that within-LEA selection is not a large problem.
Because students are grouped at a higher level in specification (5) than in
specifications (1) through (4), the standard errors are somewhat larger. How-
ever, estimates are still significant at the 5% level, and the use of this higher
grouping level does not change any qualitative conclusions.
Column (6) shows the results of adding an interaction term between track-
ing and the student not being competitive for the upper track. The estimates
show that the incentive effect on competitive students is about 0.17 standard
deviations, and that the effect on those that are not competitive is about 0.03.
This suggests that direct incentive effects are more important than net indirect
effects through teachers and peers.
The results in column (6) are also an additional indication that the observed
effects are due to the reform rather than selection. If the results were due to
selection, we would expect the effects on uncompetitive students to be much
larger.
In Figure 4, I have illustrated estimated incentive effects by year. The es-
timated difference between tracked and comprehensive regions, as indicated by
the difference between the two solid lines, is now slightly lower because the re-
sults are weighted by year rather than by school. As expected, an increasing
pattern is visible in the right half of the figure, with test scores being higher for
students whose schools reformed later. This suggests that incentive effects were
not as large for those that knew that could expect that even if they failed their
age 11 test, they would still have ended up in a comprehensive school by the
time they exited secondary education.
Summarizing, the identification of incentive effects from British data looks
credible. There were no substantial changes made to the primary school sys-
tem at the time, implying that the measured reform effect plausibly represents
10
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Figure 4: Incentive effects in the UK.
The figure shows regression-adjusted test score differences by reform year. Secondary schools
left of the divide turned comprehensive before the NCDS students could enter them, and did
not provide the incentives that the tracked schools on the right side provided them with.
Multilevel regression by reform year. The horizontal lines represent the year-level estimate
(p<0.05), dots indicate year-level errors.
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changed incentives. The biggest other threats to identification are the non-
random nature of changes in tracking policies as well as noncompliance by par-
ents and students. The estimated effect of tracking on achievement growth be-
tween ages 7 and 11 is however virtually unchanged when I add a wide range of
background variables as controls, lending credibility to the identification strat-
egy. Neither excluding movers nor using LEA-level tracking variables changes
the point estimate much. Incentive effects occur almost exclusively among stu-
dents who stood a reasonable chance of entering the upper track at all. This
adds further support to hypothesis that the observed differences are indeed due
to incentive effects.
3 The Swedish comprehensive school reform
In the Sweden of the 1940s, there was a widespread feeling that that the educa-
tional system was inadequate for the country’s needs. It was increasingly diffi-
cult to enter one of the limited number of upper track lower secondary schools,
and this problem was only to increase when the big cohorts born immediately
after the war were to enter secondary education.
The lower track was felt to be lacking as well. Other countries had been
increasing the length of compulsory education, and Sweden was seen as falling
behind. At the same time, the educational system was becoming a tool for
the emancipation both of women and of the rural areas. It was also to foster
democratic values, not by indoctrination but by “promoting respect for truth
and the motivation to find it.” (Statens Offentliga Utredningar, 1948, p. 3)
While there was general agreement that the educational system needed to
be improved, the question of whether tracking should be postponed at the same
time led to intense debate. In 1950, parliament reached an agreement first to im-
plement a comprehensive school in a select number of municipalities only. These
schools were experimental, and had varying degrees of within-school tracking
(Marklund, 1981).
In 1962 parliament accepted the general implementation of the nine-year
comprehensive secondary school, with within-school differentiation only in the
9th grade, even if within-subject differentiation continued to exist at earlier
ages. (Marklund, 1980; 1982; Richardson 1977/2004)
Sweden moved from a patchwork of schools and systems, many of them
underresourced, to a single compulsory, comprehensive school. This changed
the curriculum, the quality of education and its quantity. In the new system,
families also received additional financial support now that they had to keep
their children longer in school. (Marklund, 1981)
It is important to stress that the reform also involved changes in the first
six grades of primary school. For example, the amount of English teaching
was increased in part at the cost of Swedish. Though perhaps concentrated
mainly in the years immediately following the 1950 decision, there was also
experimentation with new teaching methods, involving less frontal instruction.
(Marklund, 1981)
I use the first two cohorts of the longitudinal Evaluation Through Follow-up
studies (Swedish abbreviation: UGU) collected by the Department of Pedagog-
ics at the University of Gothenburg and Statistics Sweden (see Harnqvist, 2000)
to see whether early test scores changed as a result of the reform. The surveys
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Table 4: Number of observations in the UGU 1948 and 1953 cohorts at age 12.
students municipalities
total tracked comprehensive
all 21877 1020
with IQ 19946 1013
with math score 17427 1005
in 1960 9290 946 801 145
in 1965 8137 930 313 617
aimed to interview all born in Sweden on the 5th, 15th and 25th of each month
in 1948 and 1953. The proportion of students for which background information
is available is very high. For the 1948 cohort, the proportion of the target pop-
ulation for which background information is known is 98%. For the 1953 cohort
this number is somewhat lower at 93% due to limited resources at Statistics
Sweden at the time.
The majority of the 1948 cohort was in 6th grade in the academic year
starting in 1960, at a time when experimentation with comprehensive schools
was fully underway. When the 1953 cohort entered 6th grade in 1965, the
comprehensive school had been implemented in a majority of municipalities.
I have data on spatial, verbal and inductive components of an age 12 ability
test for most students, as well as standardized tests in mathematics for those
who were in 6th grade of primary school. Like before, I transform each ability
subscale into a standard normal distribution, take their first principal compo-
nent and inflate it so that the standard deviation of the latent trait is one.
I transform the math score distribution into a standard normal distribution
as well, but unfortunately, I do not have enough information on subscores to
estimate reliability ratios.
I have at least some information for 21877 students in 1020 municipalities in
the full sample. As can be seen from Table 4, this decreases to 19946 students
in 1013 municipalities for which I have information on IQ, and further to 17427
students in 1005 municipalities for those which I have math scores as well.
While it may not be all too far from the truth that the students without IQ
scores were missing at random conditional on covariates, the students with IQ
scores but without a mathematics test score are not a random selection. They
partly consist of those that were not in 6th grade at age 12 and of those that had
transferred to an upper track school at an earlier age. There is thus a direct link
between the comprehensive school reform and missingness on the mathematics
test, at the very least because the comprehensive school reform abolished the
upper track schools and subjected those students to the primary school math
test. I will look at the effects of excluding this group further below.
I define a municipality as tracking if at least one student in the municipality
is reported to be in a tracked school. According to this definition, 85% of
municpalities in the final sample were tracked in 1960 and 34% were in 1965,
and so a sizable proportion of municipalities changed tracking policies between
those years. To illustrate the sensitivity of the results, I also use an alternative
measure which Holmlund (2007) has collected from administrative sources. The
correlation between the two measures is slightly above 90%.
I estimate variations of a fixed effects model
yi = α+ Tiβ +Miγ + Ciδ +Xiζ + Ziθ + εi (7)
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Table 5: The effects of the Swedish comprehensive school reform on early test
scores.
Dependent variable: IQ IQ math math
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Tracking information from UGU
tracking -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 0.00
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
ability controls yes
observations 19946 17427 17427 17427
municipalities 1013 1005 1005 1005
Tracking information from administrative sources
tracking -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.05
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
ability controls yes
observations 19916 17402 17402 17402
municipalities 1009 1002 1002 1002
Notes: All specifications include municipal fixed effects, cohort fixed effects and municipal and
individual background characteristics. Municipality level clustered standard errors in italics.
where yi is a test score outcome, Ti municipal tracking status, Mi a ma-
trix of municipality indicators, Ci a matrix of cohort indicators, Xi a matrix
with municipality×cohort background variables, Zi a matrix of individual back-
ground variables, and εi the error term. I weight individual observations with
the inverse of the number of observations per municipality×cohort, and use
standard errors clustered on the municipality level.
I have listed estimation results in Table 5. As can be seen from column (7),
the effect of the reform on IQ scores seems to have been slightly negative, both
for the tracking measure based on UGU and for the tracking measure based on
administrative sources. In both cases, the null of no effect on IQ fits comfortably
within the confidence intervals.
It is possible that we do not see a reform effect on IQ because IQ scores are
harder to change through effort than other measures of achievement. I therefore
also estimate effects on math scores. Columns (8) through (10) show results for
the subsample for whom math scores are known. As can be seen from column
(8), the reform effect on IQ is more negative in this sample, probably due to
selectively missing observations.
Column (9) shows the apparent effect on math scores in the subsample, but
is it unclear what part selectivity plays in this estimate. Under the assumption
that the true reform effect on IQ is zero, we can try to control for selectivity by
including the three IQ subscores in the regression. I do this in the last column.
The estimate of the reform effect on math scores is now zero for the UGU based
tracking measure, and moderately positive for the tracking measure based on
administrative sources.
In the end, it is hard to draw conclusions on incentive effects of tracking
based on the Swedish comprehensive school reform. None of the estimates are
significantly different from zero. At the same time, confidence intervals are wide
enough to include effects of the size estimated in the UK.
Moreover, the reform changed many aspects of education simultaneously, and
what we measure are the combined effects of multiple mechanisms. The reform
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changed the pre-test curriculum and pre-test teaching styles, it lowered the cost
of continued education and changed the amount of compulsory education. It
is possible that what we are measuring is a positive incentive effect of tracking
canceled out by other aspects of the reform. In this respect, the British reform
was a much cleaner policy experiment than the Swedish one.
4 A cross-country comparison
The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
administers various standardized tests in a large number of countries. This
allows us to look for incentive effects cross-sectionally. I use two waves of two
of the most well-known studies: the Trends in International Mathematics and
Science Study TIMSS, and the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study
PIRLS (IEA, 1995; 2001; 2003; 2006). PIRLS is an internationally comparable
early age reading literacy survey. TIMSS surveys mathematics and science
literacy at three different grades, of which I use the earliest. I take the average
of TIMSS mathematics and science scores to get a more general measure of
achievement.
Both surveys aim to test a representative sample of the population of fourth
graders in the participating countries, with the exception of TIMSS 1995 which
also tests third graders. In the main specification, I remove the third graders
from the sample in order to make the test scores more comparable across surveys.
I make no attempts to estimate reliability ratios in these data, and I stan-
dardize the achievement measures to have standard deviation one in the student
population in my sample. Rindermann (2007) finds high correlations between
country means in international achievement surveys. This is an indication that
measurement problems in international surveys are perhaps not as large as one
could otherwise think, at least when it comes to country means.
I take tracking information mainly from the Eurybase database (Eurydice,
2008), supplemented with information from Wikipedia and from various coun-
tries’ ministry of education websites. The tracking variable I will use is the
age at which a substantial proportion of students will be tracked into different
schools. This definition is close to that of Hanushek and Woessmann (2006).
Even though I try to pinpoint the start of tracking in each country to an exact
age, I use a dummy variable in the analysis, indicating tracking at an age of
12 or earlier. Though this seems somewhat arbitrary, it is not more so than to
assume that incentive effects would be linear in years. Nevertheless, results are
robust to using a different cutoff, or using a continuous tracking age instead.
As control variables, I use real per capita purchasing power-adjusted GDP
(expressed in 10 000 USD) from the Penn World Table (2006) as well as ed-
ucational expenditures as a percentage of GDP from the World Bank EdStat
database (2011). For GDP, the year of observation is always 1995. For edu-
cational expenditures, it is the available observation the closest to 1995. To
make it easier to interpret the estimates, I have listed the means and standard
deviations of these variables in cTable 6.
I limit the sample to countries that are members of the European Economic
Area or EEA. Not only is the EEA a more homogeneous group of countries,
reducing omitted variable bias, my tracking measure used is most relevant in a
European context, as it does not capture the within-school tracking and other,
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less explicit forms of stratification present in other parts of the world (Betts,
2010). The sample size for the baseline regressions is 471638 students in 28
countries.
As in the analysis of the UK school reform, I estimate a multilevel model
to take into account the correlated outcomes of individuals that share a class,
school or country. The error structure in all specifications is nested, and given
by
ε ≡ εcn + εs + εcl + εi
where subscripts cn, s, cl and i stand for country, school, class and individual
respectively. Standard errors are calculated at the country level.
Table 6: Cross-country data: means and standard deviations.
weighting
by student by country
variable µ σ µ σ
test score 0.00 1.00 -0.14 1.00
per capita GDP (’0 000 1995 USD) 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47
educational expenditures (%GDP) 1.76 0.54 1.54 0.70
students 471638
countries 28
The first specification gives the raw relationship between individual scores
ycn,s,cl,i, and the country-level tracking regime Tcn. I add an variable Ds, indi-
cating whether the score is a PIRLS or a TIMSS score.
ycn,s,cl,i = α+ Tcnβ +Dsγ + ε (11)
The results from estimating this equation can be seen from column (11) in
Table 7. Countries with early tracking clearly have higher score means, with
the mean difference as large as 0.35 standard deviations of EEA student test
scores.
There is no reason to assume that the estimated effect is not due to some
third factor. I add real per capita GDP and educational expenditure as controls
in the next specification. Both variables are contained in the country level
matrix Ccn.
ycn,s,cl,i = α+ Tcnβ +Dsγ + Ccnδ + ε (12)
The estimates from this specification can be seen from column (12). Differ-
ences in economic development are not behind the correlation between tracking
and early test scores. Estimated incentive are now even slightly higher at 0.38
standard deviations.
I have illustrated the estimate from specification (12) in Figure 5. Test scores
are clearly decreasing in the number of years the tracking point lies ahead of
grade 4. A specification linear in age may seem to fit the data better, but the
results would become more sensitive to the exact tracking ages we assign to late
tracking countries.
Hanushek and Woessmann make a slightly different assessment of the track-
ing age, even if they define tracking in the same way. A re-run of my regressions
with an age 14 tracking dummy based on the Hanushek and Woessmann variable
leaves my results almost unchanged.
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Table 7: The relationship between tracking and early test scores across countries.
Dependent variable: early age achievement
(11) (12) (13)
tracking (T ) 0.35 0.38 0.44
0.10 0.11 0.19
GDP -0.01 -0.04
0.07 0.16
expenditures 0.03 0.05
0.04 0.07
grade four 0.82
0.03
T×grade four 0.10
0.05
students 471638 471638 151108
countries 28 28 14
Notes: GDP is per capita, and expressed in tens of thousands of 1995 US dollars. Educational
expenditures are expressed as a percentage of GDP. Country level standard errors in italics.
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Figure 5: International test scores by age of tracking.
The figure is an illustration of specification (12). Early tracking countries have higher
regression-adjusted early test scores. The solid lines represent the estimate of β, dots indicate
the country-level errors. The horizontal axis has been jittered slightly to improve visibility.
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Figure 6: A widening gap in international test scores.
The gap between early and late tracking countries’ regression-adjusted test scores increases
between grades three and four. Arrows are drawn between countries’ third and fourth grade
regression-adjusted means so that the size and direction of each arrow indicates that country’s
score change between grades three and four.
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Because TIMSS 1995 tests at both grade three and four, we can see if the
estimates are larger in fourth than in third grade. To do this, I include an
interaction between tracking policies and grade in a sample limited to TIMSS
1995. As can be seen from column (13), the test score gap between early and
late tracking countries is significantly diverging between grades three and four.
As can also be seen from Figure 6, all five early tracking countries on the left
side of the figure increase their relative performance between the two grades.
All in all, it is clear that there is a robust and strong gap in early test scores
between early and late tracking countries. This gap is widening between grades
three and four, and as we know from Hanushek and Woessmann, closing between
grades four and eight or nine.
Even if these measured international differences are unlikely to to reflect
an unidirectional causal link between tracking and early test scores only, they
illustrate a remarkable but poorly understood pattern. My analysis shows that
factors related to economic development are unlikely to be behind the gap, while
the increase in the test score gap between grades three and four is suggestive
of incentive effects as at least a partial explanation. The fact that we do not
know what other factors contribute to the widening and closing of the test score
gap only underlines that we should take great care in interpreting and using
international test score data.
5 Discussion
Given economic intuition as well as previous empirical research on high-stakes
testing, it should be expected that tracking has an incentive effect on test scores
before its start; parents, teachers and students should all be expected to respond
to the incentives created.
In this paper, I find empirical evidence to support this hypothesis. In UK
data, tracking causes an average incentive effect of around 0.10 UK standard
deviations. This effect is almost entirely driven by those who have a reasonable
probability of entering the upper track, for whom the estimated effect is 0.17
standard deviations.
Within the European Economic Area, tracking is associated with 0.38 stan-
dard deviations higher scores. Both estimates are large, but the UK estimate is
smaller than the 0.2–0.3 Jacob (2005) finds for a high-stakes test, while the in-
ternational estimate is probably including other factors in addition to the causal
effect of tracking on early test scores.
Estimates based on the Swedish comprehensive school reform are centered
around zero. This can be explained by the fact that the Swedish reform consisted
of many simultaneous policy changes, also to primary schools. At the same time,
precision is too low to rule out sizable positive or negative effects of the Swedish
comprehensive school reform on early test scores.
Incentive effects of tracking have a number of implications. First, they il-
lustrate that early age educational outcomes are endogenous with respect to
later age educational policies. Individuals are forward-looking, and measured
outcomes are a result of policies at both earlier and later ages than the age of
measurement. Consequently, we should not use test scores at a certain age to
evaluate policies before that age without taking into account policies after that
age as well.
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Methodological implications extend to analyses where the early test scores
are not themselves the outcome of interest. Value added specifications are reg-
ularly used to control for unobservables (see e.g. Todd and Wolpin, 2003). Such
specifications can lead to biased estimates if the early age outcomes are affected
by the policy under consideration.
In international data, the test score gap between early and late tracking coun-
tries increases between grades three and four, then closes between grades four
and eight or nine. Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) argue that the comprehen-
sive middle schools catch up to tracked ones because they are more efficient, but
this need not be true if what we observe is actually the fading out of differential
early incentive effects.
This point holds even if the widening and subsequent closing of the test score
gap is due to other factors correlated with, but not caused by tracking. For
example, if the countries that have gone through comprehensive school reforms
are also the countries that concentrate on social and other noncognitive skills
in primary school but catch up on hard skills in middle school, value-added
estimates will still fail to recover the causal efficiency effects of comprehensive
middle schools.
The existence of incentive effects can invalidate the use of early outcomes
in some ‘placebo tests’ as well. In a carefully controlled experiment, we may
expect to find no difference between pre-treatment outcomes in treatment and
control groups. In the case of natural experiments, subjects may however be
aware of their future treatment status, and act on it. For example, Manning
and Pischke (2006) reject UK studies on tracking because they find that test
score growth between age 7 and 11 is correlated with tracking policies after the
age of 11. I argue that this correlation is exactly what we should expect.
Incentive effects of tracking also add a line of evidence to the literature on
incentives in education. There are clear parallels between the start of tracking
in early tracking systems on the one hand, and the minimum competency exams
and curriculum-based external exit exams that are commonly held a few years
later. The results presented in this paper show that this kind of incentives
are not only important at the end middle or high school, but can also affect
outcomes at the end of primary school.
Even so, it is not clear that early tracking is a good instrument to increase
competition and incentives in schools. Early tracking has a cost associated with
it in terms of inequality and probably also in intergenerational mobility, and if
comprehensive students do indeed catch up, its effects on later age outcomes may
not be very large. It is not even clear whether increased early test scores reflect
improved learning rather than improved test-taking skills (cf. Klein, Hamil-
ton, McCaffrey and Stecher, 2000; Jacob, 2005; Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman
and Kautz, 2011, section 5.6). Increased incentives of tracking can also have
more direct negative effects on intrinsic motivation and well-being (cf. Juerges,
Schneider, Senkbeil and Carstensen, 2012), and we may actually want to delay
tracking in places where primary school children are already under high pressure
to achieve.
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